The Gazette 1955-58

appeal by the Marchioness of Winchester, from an order in chambers on April nth, 1956, granting leave to solicitors, Messrs. Polak & Co., to withdraw a'bill of costs delivered to the appellant on September yth, 1955, and to deliver in substitution therefor a new bill of costs differing only from the original bill in including disbursements to counsel included in the original bill but not paid at the date when the bill came before the taxing master. Leave to appeal was given by the Court on May yth, 1956. Mr. Curtis-Bennett, for the appellant, said that when the original bill came before the taxing master it was discovered that counsels' fees had not been disbursed and the solicitors applied for an adjourn ment so that a new bill could be substituted. Im mediately the adjournment was granted, counsel's fees were paid ; the fees amounted to a large pro portion, £302 145. out of £551 145. 3d., of the bill. The main ground of appeal was that the judge had no jurisdiction to allow the solicitors to substitute a bill in the manner ordered, and the second ground of appeal was that, in so far as the Judge had a discretion,he had exercised it on the wrong principles. No imputations of any kind were made against the solicitors and he, counsel, was anxious to keep away from the merits of the matter; it sufficed to say that the detailed taxation as and when it took place would be most bitterly contested by the appellant. Per Jenkins, L.J. :—" In my judgment if the Court was satisfied that the case was one in which the solicitor had acted honestly and merited assistance the inherent jurisdiction of the Court extended to a withdrawal of a bill already delivered, where counsel's fees had not actually been paid, and the substitution of another bill, by which time the fees would have been paid. On the question whether the present case was one in which the Judge should have exercised his discretion in favour of the solicitors, I agree that this was a borderline case, but the Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that he could exercise his discretion in the solicitors' favour, and I feel that if I had been sitting as a Judge of first instance I would have come to the same conclusion." (Polak v. Marchioness of Winchester — [1956] 2. All E. R-. 660). County Manager entitled to separate costs on appearance before Local Inquiry directed by Minister for Local Government. THE Minister for Local Government directed that a local inquiry be held into the performance by D. McC., the County Manager for the County of Cavan, of the executive functions of the Counril. By Order dated the 3rd October, 1950, the Minister,

in the exercise of the powers vested in him by s. 90 of the Local Government Act, 1946, directed that D. McC. might appear separately at the inquiry. This Order did not purport to limit the cost of the separate appearance. The County Council refused to requisition taxation of D. McC.'s costs and on the ist February, 1951, the Taxing Master taxed the costs at £2,488 iys. 2d. By letter dated the i5th January, 1952, the Minister in purported pursuance of s. 90 sub-s. (2) (/>) of the Local Government Act, 1946, purported to limit to £900 the sum to be paid by the County Council to D. McC. for his costs and on the jth April, 1952, the County Council sent to D. McC. the said sum of £900. Held by Supreme Court (Maguire C. J., Lavery and Kingsmill Moore, JJ., O'Byrne J., dissenting) reversing Dixon J., that the Minister's direction of the 15th January, 1952, purporting to limit the cost of the County Manager's separate appearance at the inquiry was ultra vires and void, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration sought and to judgment against the Cavan County Council for the sum of £2,488 iys. 2d. Per Lavery J. :—" The Minister has ample powers to punish an officer of a local authority who has failed in his duty and it is satisfactory to know that he does not consider that condemning him to bear his reasonable legal costs and expenses is one of them. No indication was given by Counsel as to what they submitted the Minister should take into consideration, and, of course, none as to what he had considered in the present case. In the exercise of the power, whatever may be its nature and extent, the Minister is, of course, bound to act according to the rules of reason and justice, not capriciously or arbitrarily, but on judicial grounds and for substantial reasons. The Court cannot, however, control the exercise of the power in the absence of evidence as to the grounds on which the Minister acted and it is not claimed that there is any material on which the Court could enter into an inquiry. The only question, therefore, is when the power may be exercised. There are many considerations which lead me, with reasonable certainty, to the conclusion that the power should ordinarily be exercised when the order under sub-section i is made and that it certainly cannot be exercised after the Manager has, in pursuance of the order, appeared at the inquiry at least in so far as liability has been incurred. When, in pursuance of an order the County Manager appears—as may be his duty and certainly is his necessity—costs are incurred and if no limit has been imposed—lie is on the strictest reading of the section entitled to be paid these costs, being reasonable."