The Gazette 1952-1955

appears to be no corresponding Irish rule) which, in the absence o f consent, limits the power to direct payment by the defendant o f costs other than party and pa rty ? No, said Willmer J ., as regards (1) and (2). In the absence o f consent the rule takes precedence over the Act, and there is no discretion in England to award any other than party and party costs. Willmer J. in a lengthy judgment reviews all the authorities on the subject. (Thomason v. Swan, Hunter & Wighman Richardson Ltd., re “ The Albion ” (No. 2) (1954) 1. W .L.R., 1220). In a motion f o r an order o f prohibition directed to a statutory tribunal to prohibit them from fu rth er proceeding on a reference made by a Minister after the application and is refused, should the applicants pay the costs o f both the Minister and a trade union who, though representing the same interest, were separately represented by counsel ? No, said a Queen’s Bench Divisional Court (Lord Goddard, C. J ., Slade and Cassels). Per Lord Goddard, C. J. :— The Court does not like having to give two sets o f costs in these cases. It seems to us that if the Minister is satisfied that the trade union is represented and argue the case, then the Minister ought not to be represented—or vice-versa. It is desirable to say that the opinion o f the Court is that in future in matters o f this sort, not more than one set o f costs will be granted.” (R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal and National Union o f Bank Employees—ex parte American Express Co. Inc. (1954) 2, A ll E .R ., 764). Can the Court, in an application by a widow under the Inheritance (Family Provision) A ct, 1938, f o r fu rther provision to be made f o r her, rectify a mistake o f the applicant's solicitor, who, not knowing the law, had not made this appliction within six months after taking out the grant o f probate, and duly applied f o r an extension o f time ? No, said Roxburgh J. The mistake o f the solicitors was not a “ circumstance affecting the administration or distribution o f the estate ” within the rule, so that there was no jurisdiction to extend the time. Per Roxburgh J . :—-“ The plaintiff had ample time within the prescribed period, and even after negotia­ tions were suspended (to consider points raised by the Revenue) to issue the summons, and this step would undoubtedly have been taken by anybody aware o f the time limit. I certainly cannot lay down a rule that it would be unfair not to extend the time in every case in which no distribution had yet been made, for this happens in the great majority of cases.” (Re Greaves deed.—Greaves v. Greaves ( 1954 ) 1 , W .L.R., 760). 42

LAND REGISTRATION RULES, 1954 . T he Land Registration Rules, 1954 (S.I. No. 180/1954) came into operation on 1st September, 1954, and substitute new rules relating to solicitors’ costs for rules 241 to 246 o f the Land Registration Rules, 1937, as amended. The new rules are on sale at the Government Publications Sale Office, G.P.O. Arcade, Dublin, price 6d. DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST. Is a husband, who is mainly successful in an appli­ cation made under Section 17 o f the Married Women's Property A ct, 1882, in respect o f his title to certain moneys and property which his wife disputed, and in which his wife was ordered to pay one-fifth o f his costs, liable to pay f o r his w ife’s solicitors' claim f o r their professional charges ? Yes, said Stable J. These professional charges are recoverable from the husband under common law, as the wife was an agent of necessity. PerS tab leJ.:—• “ The husband has called no evidence before me to the effect that his former wife, who is now living in Australia, apart from trifling personal matters, ever possessed a penny piece. In this case the wife was forced by straitened circumstances either to pledge her husband’s credit to employ a solicitor or to do withoutone. As regards the issue o f the proceedings, although the result may fairly be said to have been somewhat in the husband’s favour, I think the wife was perfectly reasonable in fighting the summons. It was highly advantageous for her to do so. Indeed, as a result, she was left in the flat until alternative accommodation was found for her by her husband. It may be that the legislature may think fit to inter­ vene and make some further provision which will prevent impecunious wives from involving their husbands in litigation under that particular section, which, whatever the result may be, must end in the financial discomfiture o f the husband; but that is the business o f the legislature, if they so think, and not for me.” (J. N. Nabarro & Sons v. Kennedy ( 1954 ) 3 W .L.R., 296). Has the Court, in actions under the Fatal Accidents Acts, unlimited discretion under Section 5o o f the Supreme Court o f Judicature ( Consolidation ) Act. 1925, cor­ responding to Section 52 o f the Judicature A ct (Ireland), 1877, to award costs on (1) a solicitor and client basis, or (2) a solicitor and own client basis, i.e., a complete indem­ nity or, (3) is it limited by the terms o f the English Pules o f the Supreme Court, Order 22, Pule 14 (fo r which there